Supreme Court puts new limits on vehicle searches
Supreme Court rules states can forbid payroll deductions for political purposes
Supreme Court upholds passenger searches
High Court backs cops
 

Supreme Court Puts New Limits on Vehicle Searches

(Posted: April 22, 2009)

By DAVID STOUT, The New York Times

WASHINGTON — The Supreme Court on Tuesday put new limits on the circumstances under which police officers who lack a search warrant can search a vehicle immediately after the arrest of a suspect.

Officers who lack a warrant may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle after an occupant is arrested only if it is reasonable to believe that the person arrested could still gain access to the vehicle, or if the vehicle contains evidence relevant to the arrest, the court said.

In a 5-to-4 ruling that cut across the liberal versus conservative stereotypes of the current lineup of justices, the court affirmed a ruling by the Arizona Supreme Court, which overturned the conviction and three-year prison sentence against Rodney J. Gant of Tucson on a drug charge.

On Aug. 25, 1999, Mr. Gant was arrested for driving while his license was suspended. After he was handcuffed and placed in a patrol car, officers searched Mr. Gant’s car and found cocaine in the pocket of a jacket. The trial court denied Mr. Gant’s motion to suppress the drug evidence, but the Arizona high court ruled in the defendant’s favor, reasoning that the search was not necessary for the officers’ safety or to preserve evidence.

Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the majority in the United States Supreme Court ruling in Arizona v. Gant, No. 07-542, agreed, and said that the State of Arizona, which had asked the high court to overrule the Arizona tribunal, “seriously undervalues the privacy interests at stake.”

“Although we have recognized that a motorist’s privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than in his home,” Justice Stevens wrote, “the former interest is nevertheless important and deserving of constitutional protection.”

Justices David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens’s opinion, as might be expected, but so did Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, who often differ with their more liberal colleagues.

Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. dissented, as might be expected, and he was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy — but also by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, who is typically placed in the court’s liberal wing.

Prosecutors relied on a 1981 Supreme Court ruling, in a case from New York State, that the police may search the passenger compartment of a car without a warrant provided they do so soon after the arrest of a recent occupant.

But the incident that gave rise to the 1981 ruling involved “a single officer confronted with four unsecured arrestees” on the New York Thruway; thus, the safety of the officer, as well as the need to preserve evidence, may have justified an immediate search without a warrant, the majority noted on Tuesday in rejecting a broad reading of the old ruling.

In contrast, Mr. Gant’s car was in a driveway, where “five officers handcuffed and secured Gant and the two other suspects in separate patrol cars before the search began,” Justice Stevens wrote.

In dissent, Justice Alito said the majority had needlessly overturned the Supreme Court’s own precedents in search-and-seizure cases, even though “Gant has not asked us to do so.”

“The court’s decision will cause the suppression of evidence gathered in many searches carried out in good-faith reliance on well-settled case law,” Justice Alito lamented. Although the majority refused to acknowledge it as such, its decision effectively overrules the 1981 ruling, New York v. Belton, Justice Alito said.

When the Arizona case was argued on Oct. 7, the remarks of Justices Scalia and Breyer signaled how they might rule. Justice Scalia said then that it was “just silly” for anyone to assert that Mr. Gant, handcuffed in a police car, might pose a threat, as the defendant in the Belton case may have back in 1981.

Justice Breyer said last October that, while he might not agree with the 1981 decision, “it has been the law for 27 years.” He went on to say that “I take very seriously, as we all do, the principle of stare decisis,” the doctrine that precedents should not lightly be disturbed.

But Justice Stevens (who turned 89 on Monday) said that “stare decisis does not require adherence to a broad reading of Belton.”

“The experience of the 28 years since Belton has shown that the generalization underpinning the broad reading of that decision is unfounded, and blind adherence to its faulty assumptions would authorize myriad unconstitutional searches,” Justice Stevens wrote.

Daniel J. Capra, a Fordham University Law School professor and an expert on evidence, said the way the justices ruled on Tuesday was not really surprising to people who follow the court closely, given that Justices Scalia and Ginsburg had criticized the Belton ruling, and Justice Stevens dissented in that case.

“The case will essentially have no impact when a driver or occupant is arrested for a crime for which there is evidence,” Mr. Capra said. “But it will have a major impact when the driver is arrested for a traffic offense.” Back to top 

Supreme Court Rules States Can Forbid Payroll Deductions For Political Purposes

By Will Aitchison
Labor Relations Information System, Feb. 24, 2009

Earlier today, the United States Supreme Court upheld an Idaho law that prohibits the State's political subdivisions such as cities and counties from allowing payroll deductions “for political activities.” A group of labor organizations challenged the law, contending that it violated their members' rights to engage in free speech.

In rejecting the challenge in an opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held “The First Amendment prohibits government from "abridging the freedom of speech"; it does not confer an affirmative right to use government payroll mechanisms for the purpose of obtaining funds for expression. Idaho's law does not restrict political speech, but rather declines to promote that speech by allowing public employee checkoffs for political activities. Such a decision is reasonable in light of the State's interest in avoiding the appearance that carrying out the public's business is tainted by partisan political activity. That interest extends to government at the local as well as state level, and nothing in the First Amendment prevents a State from determining that its political subdivisions may not provide payroll deductions for political activities. . . . The question is whether the State must affirmatively assist political speech by allowing public employers to administer payroll deductions for political activities. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the answer is no.”

As is usually the situation in employment cases, the Court's opinion was not unanimous. Leading the dissenting judges, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote “In both the public and private sector, payroll managers routinely remit portions of employees' wages to third parties pursuant to the employees' written instructions. For decades, employers in Idaho had discretion to allow such payroll deductions. In 2003, however, the State enacted [a law] which, among other things, prohibits employers from allowing any payroll deduction for "political activities," For several reasons, I cannot conclude as the Court does that this restriction on payroll deductions was reasonably calculated to further the State's "interest in separating the operation of government from partisan politics.”. Because it is clear to me that the restriction was intended to make it more difficult for unions to finance political speech, I would hold it unconstitutional in all its applications. Back to top

 
Supreme Court upholds passenger searches

East Valley Tribune via YellowBrix, Jan 27, 2009

WASHINGTON – Calling the intrusion “minimal,” the U.S. Supreme Court on Monday upheld the ability of police to pat down the passenger of a vehicle stopped for unrelated reasons – and, by extension, the ability to charge that person with illegal possession of a gun.

In a unanimous decision involving a Tucson arrest, the justices acknowledged that, in a lawful traffic stop, there is reason to believe the driver has committed an offense. Similarly, they said, there generally is no reason to stop or detain the passengers.

But Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the court, said officers may act if there is a “reasonable suspicion” they may be armed and dangerous.

She said there is a possibility of violence if those in the vehicle – including passengers – are concerned that the stop will lead to uncovering evidence of something more serious than the traffic violation. And Ginsburg said since the vehicle is already stopped, along with its passengers, the additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal.

Monday’s ruling, however, does not end the matter. The justices said that Edith Cunningham, a Pima County public defender handling the case for Lemon M. Johnson, will still get a chance to prove that Oro Valley police officer Maria Trevizo lacked that “reasonable suspicion” necessary to search him in the first place.

According to court records, Trevizo was on patrol in 2002 with two other officers in a midtown Tucson neighborhood.

Trevizo testified that the area is associated with the Crips gang and that gang members usually wear blue. She also said that “gang members will often, in general, possess firearms.”

They stopped a vehicle because a check of the license plate showed a violation of Arizona’s mandatory auto insurance laws.

There was no specific reason to suspect criminal activity.

The vehicle had a driver, someone in the passenger seat and Johnson in the back.

Trevizo said she noticed Johnson was wearing clothing, including a blue bandanna, she considered consistent with Crips membership. He also had a police scanner in his jacket pocket, something she said was unusual unless someone were going to commit a crime or evade police. Back to top

High Court backs cops

By American Police Beat

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that police can conduct searches and seize evidence after arrests that may have violated state law. The high court ruling comes from a case out of Portsmouth, Virginia, where city detectives seized crack cocaine from a motorist after arresting him for a minor traffic offense. David Lee Moore was pulled over for driving on a suspended license.

The violation is a minor crime in Virginia and calls for the police to issue a court summons and to let the driver go. But instead the detectives arrested Moore. Prosecutors in the case said that drugs taken from him in a subsequent search could be used against him as evidence.

"We reaffirm against a novel challenge what we have signaled for half a century," Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the court. Scalia said that when officers have probable cause to believe a person had committed a crime in their presence, the Fourth Amendment permits them to make an arrest and to search the suspect to safeguard evidence and to ensure their own safety.

Moore was convicted on drug charges and sentenced to three and a half years in prison.The Virginia Supreme Court had previously ruled that the police should have released Moore, and as a result, they could not lawfully conduct a search. State law, the Virginia Court said, restricted the officers to issuing a ticket. Virginia courts had dismissed the indictment against Moore. But the Virginia attorney general said an arrest was reasonable, under the constitutional definition, if the officers have probable cause to believe a suspect has committed a crime.

Moore's attorney argued that the Fourth Amendment permits a search only after a lawful state arrest. In a concurring opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said she found more support for Moore's position in previous court cases than the rest of the Supreme Court had. The Bush administration and attorneys general from 18 states had supported the Virginia prosecutors. The Supreme court decision was unanimous. Back to top